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I. INTRODUCTION
N 2011, A STUDY by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
advisory committee reportedly found that an increasing pro-
portion of the commercial air accidents that occurred over the
last five years were the result of pilot error.' The media and
certain government officials have attributed these accidents
caused by pilot error to pilot fatigue and pilot training, which is
now directed more toward aircraft technology rather than flight
maneuvering. 2 Pilots are "forgetting how to fly."3 If this is true,
however, accident reports issued after recent plane crashes do
not reflect this reality.
Piloting is becoming increasingly automatic as equipment
continues to advance. Despite this, aviation experts are saying
that pilot error is playing an increased role in crashes.4 One
crash in particular directed public attention to the issue of pilot
error over the last few years,5 causing Congress to repeatedly ac-
knowledge problems with FAA duty and rest requirements as
See Bill Sanderson, Auto-Pilots' Scary Skies - Computers Taking over Airliners, N.Y.
POST, Aug. 31, 2011, at 6 (reporting that the study concluded that "[c] ommercial
airline pilots are 'forgetting how to fly' as equipment becomes more advanced-
and the loss of those important skills have had deadly results").
2 Id.; see also Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, AIR SAFETY WK., May 18,
2009, http://www.aviationtoday.com/asw/categories/commercial/32152.html
(discussing the issue of fatigue while flying).
3 Sanderson, supra note 1. The statement was originally made by Captain Rory
Kay, the co-chair of an FAA advisory committee on pilot training, in a statement
to the Associated Press: "We're seeing a new breed of accident with these state-of-
the art planes.... We're forgetting how to fly." Joan Lowy, AP Impact: Automation
in the Air Dulls Pilot Skill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 30, 2011, available at http://
vvw.kypost.com/dpps/news/automation-in-the-air-dulls-pilot-skill_6687073.
4 See Lowy, supra note 3.
5 See Matthew L. Wald & Liz Robbins, 50 Killed as Plane Hits House near Buffalo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at Al.
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well as training requirements.6 The FAA has responded with
new rules in both areas.7 But the new rules are misfocused and
will impose billions of dollars of compliance costs on the airlines
at a time when the airlines cannot afford them and the rules are
not needed.8 These rules are unnecessary for three reasons.
First, the current rules are more than sufficient. Second, the law
allows plaintiffs to recover from airlines, pilots, and their insur-
ance companies where pilots bear some or all of the responsibil-
ity for aviation accidents. Finally, history has shown that the
consequences, particularly the unintended consequences, of
these rules are likely to harm rather than help the airline
industry.
Part II of this comment looks at the history of aviation safety,
marked by periods in which different agencies and different leg-
islation guided the field. In order to learn from monumental
changes in the history of aviation safety, it analyzes the impact of
deregulation, a process by which the FAA stopped controlling
fares and allowed the market to determine air prices.9 It also
looks closely at the Colgan airplane accident of 2009, a tragic
event that killed fifty people and served as the impetus for re-
cent changes in legislation and regulation."
Part III examines the current state of the law by looking at the
FAA regulations in place in 2009 that became the focus of media
attention. Specifically, this part examines the regulations cover-
ing pilot duty and rest requirements, as well as those covering
pilot training requirements. Part III also covers the recent cam-
paigns to change these two sets of rules and examines how
courts have handled these issues.
Part IV analyzes the historical background and laws presented
in Parts II and III and concludes that no regulatory change was
necessary, as inevitable human error, rather than pilot error,"
6 See Schumer Calls for Hearing into Colgan Tragedy, Emails Released, AR SAFETY
WK., Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.aviationtoday.com/asw/topstories/Schumer-
Calls-for-Hearing-Into-Colgan-Tragedy-Emails-Released_74730.html.
7 See Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 10,
2011, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=16838455&itype=storyID.
8 See id.
9 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1705-07.
10 See Wald & Robbins, supra note 5.
11 The law uses these two terms interchangeably in the field of aviation. For
purposes of this comment, the author distinguishes between them by referring to
human error as something accepted, something that cannot be affected by regu-
lation. Pilot error, on the other hand, refers to errors made by pilots that are
possible to resolve through regulation, particularly regulation of pilot training.
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was the primary cause of the Colgan crash. Part IV also analyzes
the evolution of pilot training requirements in the context of
the history presented in Part II and the lessons that can be
learned from it. Finally, Part IV proposes that legislative re-
straint, rather than new laws and rules, is the solution to the
problems that recent regulatory reform sought to tackle.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AVIATION SAFETY
A. REGULATING AVIATION: "SAFETY FIRST, LAST, AND ALWAYS" 1 2
1. Air Commerce Act of 1926
Until 1926, states and localities governed regulation of air-
craft and pilots? 3 In 1926, Congress began regulating aircraft
and pilots at the federal level with the passage of the Air Com-
merce Act, which put the Department of Commerce's new Aero-
nautics Branch in charge of "fostering air commerce, issuing
and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying air-
craft, establishing airways, and operating and maintaining aids
to air navigation."' 4
2. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
Unlike the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 sought to establish "comprehensive" federal regula-
tion of aviation in that it increased the focus on accidents.15
This law established the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) and
tasked it with accident investigation and prevention. 6 Later,
the CAA split into two federal agencies: the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). 7 The
CAB maintained control of pilot and aircraft certification as well
12 Histoiy: A Brief History of the FAA, FAA, http://www.faa.gov/about/history/
briefhistory/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) [hereinafter FAA History] (promoting
safety statistics from 2001 to 2007 on the FAA website under the heading, "Safety
First, Last, and Always").
13 Mark Flores, Blast Off?-Strict Liability's Potential Role in the Development of the
Commercial Space Market, 17 R1CH.J.L. & TECH. 2, 11, 14-15 (2010) (looking at the
history of aviation regulation and deregulation as part of assessments and predic-
tions regarding "federal regulation with respect to commercial space travel").
14 FAA History, supra note 12.
15 See Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1997)
(describing the history of aviation regulation as part of a discussion of whether
the federal court had jurisdiction).
16 FAA History, supra note 12.
17 Id.
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as accident investigation. 8 Despite these developments, regula-
tion during this time was described as "spotty," "unfocused," and
"flawed." 9
In 1956, a tragic accident directed media and congressional
attention to federal air regulation and safety.20 A Trans World
Airlines (TWA) plane and a United Airlines plane collided in
"uncontrolled airspace," killing all the passengers on board both
planes-a total of 117 people.2' Daniel Bubb described how the
public reaction to the crash affected the policy that followed:
Newspaper headlines nationwide pointed out the obvious prob-
lem: the government was unequipped to handle the rapidly ex-
panding air traffic, especially jets. The American public angrily
criticized the government, but specifically targeted the Civil Avia-
tion Authority for not doing its job. Washington finally realized
that it did not need just an oversight board, but an entire sepa-
rate, independent agency to handle all aviation affairs.22
Thus, as a result of media coverage and public pressure, a new
era of regulation began with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.23
3. Federal Aviation Act of 1958
In 1958, Congress vested the responsibilities of the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration and the CAB in the new Federal Aviation
Agency. 24 In 1967, this agency became the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) that still exists today as part of the Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT), a cabinet-level department
created at the same time as the FAA. 25 Over the next forty-five
years, the FAA evolved, adapting to the growth of air commerce
and the emergence of new threats to airline safety. 26 For exam-
ple, airplane hijackings presented one of these "unexpected
challenges. "27 Throughout this time, although the specific
18 Id.
19 Daniel K. Bubb, The Successes and Failures of Presidential Policy on Commercial
Air Travel, 71 J. AiR L. & CoM. 653, 661 (2006) (quoting STUART I. ROCHESTER,
TAKEOFF AT MID-CENTURY: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY IN THE EISENHOWER
YEARS 1953-1961 291 (1976)) (describing the history of aviation regulation and
deregulation).
20 Id. at 659-60.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 660.
23 See id.
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threats to safety were changing, the FAA's primary concern was
always safety, with its main focus on air traffic control.2s How-
ever, the most basic safety function of the FAA-the certification
of pilots-remains an issue, 29 despite the emergence of the
more complicated safety threats during the agency's existence.
B. DEREGULATION
Within the FAA, the CAB continued to regulate airfare while
the rest of the agency was concerned with safety. During the
1970s, the U.S. economy was in a recession and airfares were
inconsistent.3 0 "The federal government consistently was slow to
respond with funding and implemented necessary changes only
when necessary to deal with an immediate crisis. The FAA, in
particular, demonstrated this sluggish response by failing to im-
plement new laws and enforce existing regulations concerning
flight safety."'" The late Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy of Mas-
sachusetts led an effort to reform the regulatory structure of the
FAA, holding hearings to investigate high fares.32 The cause of
the high fares seemed to be the lack of competition. 33 The
CAB, and its fare regulation, had to go. 34 The Nixon, Ford, and
Carter administrations all supported reform. 35 As Justice Ste-
phen Breyer later reflected on this bipartisan support, "The
hearings brought together a Democratic senator and a Republi-
can President in Gerald Ford. They created alliances among
consumer groups, pro-competition business groups, economists,
and regulatory reformers. '3 6 The Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA) passed with overwhelming support in both the Senate
and the House. 37 President Carter signed it into law in 1978.38
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., Sanderson, supra note 1.
30 Bubb, supra note 19, at 662-63 (citing ELIZABETH BAILEY, DAVID GRAHAM &
DANIEL KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 31 (1985)).
31 Id. at 667.
32 Id. at 663; Stephen Breyer, Airline Deregulation, Revisited: Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer Reflects on the Benefits of Competition-and Its Hazards, BLOOMBERG
Bus.WK., (Jan. 20, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dn
flash/content/an20l1/db20110120_138711 .htm.
33 Breyer, supra note 32.
34 See id.
35 Bubb, supra note 19, at 662-64.
36 Breyer, supra note 32.
37 Bubb, supra note 19, at 663-64 (The Senate and House votes in favor of the




Thus, beginning in 1978, the airline industry began a phase of
"deregulation. '3 9 The purpose of the ADA, which amended the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, was "to encourage, develop, and
attain an air transportation system [that] relies on competitive
market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air
services."4 ° The legislation achieved this by eliminating the
CAB, which had been setting commercial air prices for years.4'
Congress emphasized that it did not intend for the law to lower
the existing safety standards.42 As stated in Section 107 of the
ADA, "The Congress intends that the implementation of the Air-
line Deregulation Act of 1978 result in no diminution of the
high standard of safety in air transportation attained in the
United States at the time of the enactment of such Act. -4 3
But deregulation had unintended, harmful consequences.4 4
Competition increased, the market became saturated, and prof-
its declined.45 As a result, airlines filed for bankruptcy and
workers went on strike.46 Justice Breyer, who was a staffer for
Senator Kennedy during the push for deregulation and "helped
pass" the legislation, described these unintended results of der-
egulation as "unforeseen" consequences.47
No one foresaw the industry's spectacular growth, with the num-
ber of air passengers increasing from 207.5 million in 1974 to
721.1 million [in 2010]. As a result, no one foresaw the extent to
which new bottlenecks would develop: a flight-choked Northeast
corridor, overcrowded airports, delays, and terrorist risks conse-
quently making air travel increasingly difficult. Nor did anyone
foresee the extent to which change might unfairly harm workers
in the industry.48
For better or worse, airline prices are now deregulated and that
is not likely to change.49
39 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
40 Id,
41 See Bubb, supra note 19, at 664.
42 See Airline Deregulation Act § 107.
43 Id.
44 See Bubb, supra note 19, at 663-64.
45 Id. at 664.
46 Id. at 664-65.
47 Breyer, supra note 32.
48 Id. After weighing these negative consequences of deregulation, Justice
Breyer ultimately concluded that deregulation was "worthwhile" because even
though airline revenue has gone down, "fares have gone down" and "the number
of travelers has gone way up." Id.
49 See id.
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But over thirty years after the passage of the ADA, its unin-
tended consequences continue to be discussed and its success
continues to be assessed, showing that reactionary changes to
aviation regulation, however well-intended, have lasting
effects. 5°
C. COLGAN CRASH OF 2009
1. What Happened
One crash in particular has attracted a lot of media attention
over the last few years, causing significant public reaction and
calls for changes to federal aviation regulation, particularly with
respect to duty and rest requirements for pilots.51 "On February
12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash 8-Q400 (N200WQ) op-
erating as Continental Connection Flight 3407, crashed during
an instrument approach to Runway 23 at the Buffalo-Niagara In-
ternational Airport.... 52 All of the passengers on board the
plane and one person on the ground died.5 3 In the months that
followed, concerns increased "about pilot fatigue, failed flying
tests and cockpit warning systems. ' '54 The National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB) held hearings to determine the cause
of the accident and make recommendations.5 5
The NTSB hearings on the Colgan crash revealed that pilot
error played a prominent role.56 As the plane experienced an
aerodynamic stall, or a wing stall, the captain and co-pilot vio-
lated rules and "made critical errors" that rendered them una-
ble to maneuver the plane correctly as it was crashing.57 Most
importantly, "when Flight 3407's stick-pusher kicked in, [Cap-
tain] Renslow pulled back on the plane's control column, ap-
parently trying to bring the aircraft out of the sudden dive by
bringing the aircraft's nose up. '5 8 If the plane had been in a
"horizontal tail stall caused by tailplane icing," the pull-back pro-
50 See id.
51 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2 (extensively cover-
ing "[t]hree days of testimony before the National Transportation Safety Board"










cedure used by Captain Renslow would have been proper.
However, "[plushing forward to gain speed is the proper proce-
dure for a wing stall" like the one this plane was experiencing.6 °
The hearings revealed that, in addition to the maneuvering
error by Captain Renslow, both the captain and the co-pilot vio-
lated "the 'sterile cockpit' rule which prohibits extraneous con-
versation on the flight deck during landing approach."6 1 The
sterile cockpit rule is rarely the subject of litigation or contro-
versy.62 Thus, these hearings did not involve allegations or im-
plications that its violation led to the crash in any direct way.63
In fact, this violation was only mentioned in passing.64
Instead, the focus of the hearings turned on whether the cap-
tain and co-pilot were adequately rested prior to the flight.65
The testimony showed two possibilities: either they both were
adequately rested, or, if not, any fatigue they were experiencing
was caused not by their work schedule but by their own choices
prior to flight.66 According to Colgan, "Captain Renslow had
nearly [twenty-two] consecutive hours of time off before he re-
ported for duty on the day of the accident, '67 and "First Officer
Shaw had been off work for three days since her last flight."68 In
the case of First Officer Shaw, fatigue was likely, but not because
59 Id.
' Id.
61 Id. The sterile cockpit rule is an FAA regulation prohibiting "any activity
during a critical phase of flight which could distract any flight crewmember from
the performance of his or her duties or which could interfere in any way with the
proper conduct of those duties." The rule lists examples of such prohibited activ-
ities "such as eating meals, engaging in nonessential conversations .... and read-
ing publications not related to the proper conduct of the flight." 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.542(b) (2011); 14 C.F.R. § 135.100(b) (2011).
62 See Elassaad-v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 129-31 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that FAA regulations do not preempt state law claims related to "disem-
barkation of passengers" and "not[ing] that [the sterile cockpit rule and other]
regulations under the Aviation Act do not specifically regulate the conduct of the
crew in connection with the loading or unloading of passengers," but instead are
directed at maintaining safety during flight); see also Rubin v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (mentioning the rule in a
case involving an unruly passenger, but only to emphasize the importance of
avoiding distractions in the cockpit).
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of her flight schedule.69 She had not flown for three days prior
to the flight, but "did not reserve adequate time to travel from
her home to her base in order to ensure she was properly rested
and fit for duty. 70
2. Response from the Media and Congress
The Colgan accident was a salacious media story.71 Reports
appealed to fear: a plane crashed, hitting a house, and causing
an "intense fire at the site of the crash. '72 Fifty people were
killed, one of them a person minding his own business inside his
home. 73 Reports also provided mystery and intrigue, conjuring
images of "investigators in Washington . . .comb[ing] through
* . . tapes.
74
Reports were not only scary and mysterious, but they were also
heartbreaking. The reports described the death of a "human
rights advocate," a widow whose husband had been killed in the
September 11 th attacks, and people traveling to birthday parties
and reunions.75 They even covered "bitter ironies" such as the
death of "a Vietnam veteran who had twice survived helicopter
accidents during the war. '76 And the "technical details" prom-
ised to be just as "chilling. ' 77 The "painstaking" investigation 7
would eventually reveal that the pilots "made critical errors,"
and that these errors were the cause of the crash.79
Months and even years later, once it had become clear that
pilot error contributed to the crash, the media continued to
cover the story.8 0 Headlines attracted readers with mention of
69 [d.
70 Id.







78 See id. (quoting David Bissonette, Emergency Coordinator for the town of
Clarence Center, New York, where the accident took place).
79 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2.
80 See Alan Levin, Airline: Pilot Didn't Disclose Failed Tests: Captain in Crash Had
Flunked Three Proficiency Exams, USA TODAY, May 14, 2009, at 3A; James Hill, 'Smok-
ing Gun' Emails Released in 2009 Buffalo Plane Crash, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011,
7:13 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/10/smoking-gun-
emails-released-in-lawsuit-over-2009-buffalo-plane-crash/; Phil Fairbanks, Emails
Reveal Bosses' Doubts About Renslow: Documents Support Flight 3407 Families' Allega-
tions Pilot Lacked Training, Experience, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 22, 2011, at Al.
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"failed tests," an airline that had "kept scores secret," and "smok-
ing gun emails."' Most recently, in October 2011, news regard-
ing the crash included reports of emails sent during the months
before the incident that discussed Captain Renslow's training
status and flight eligibility.8 2 According to an attorney repre-
senting families suing Colgan, these emails showed that Captain
Renslow had demonstrated some deficiencies in training, and
that Colgan knew of these deficiencies.8 3 For this reason, the
attorney referred to them as the "smoking gun" in his clients'
case against the airline.84
The media was not alone in its response to the Colgan crash.
Congress responded as well by holding hearings and eventually
passing legislation requiring the FAA to change its regulation of
rest requirements and pilot training.85 These "hearings and the
introduction of the Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improve-
ment Act" arose "out of concern that improvements would take
too long to implement in the FAA's rulemaking process. "86
Then, over two years later, the release and media discussion of
the "smoking gun"87 emails triggered yet another round of hear-
ings.88 Because these "relevant emails were not shared" during
the initial NTSB investigation, Senator Charles Schumer of New
York requested this second round of hearings "to determine"
whether "the investigation process that was conducted by the
[NTSB] who found the cause to be pilot error, [could] be
improved."89
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS
The Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator
have certain duties and powers "related to aviation safety" under
49 U.S.C. § 10 6 (g).90 These include reporting to the President
81 See Levin, supra note 80; Hill, supra note 80.
82 See Hill, supra note 80; Fairbanks, supra note 80.
83 Id.
84 Hill, supra note 80.
85 Frances Fiorino, Colgan Crash Leading to Pilot Training Overhaul, AVIATION
WK., Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp-includes/articlePrint.
jsp?storyID=news/awst/2010/02/08/AW0208_2O1Op35-201948.xml&head
Line=Colgan%20Crash % 20Leading%2OTo%2OPilot%20Training% 200verhaul.
86 Id.
87 Hill, supra note 80.
88 Schumer Calls for Hearing into Colgan Tragedy, Emails Released, supra note 6.
89 Id.
90 49 U.S.C. § 106(g) (2006).
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and Congress,9 1 participating in accident investigations,9 2 taking
appropriate safety considerations,93 making decisions on the use
of airspace, 94 granting public interest exemptions from regula-
tion 15 reporting on investigations and their conclusions, 6 and
conducting research and development.9 7 These duties and pow-
ers allow the FAA to regulate in order to promote air safety.
FAA regulations have the "force and effect of law."9 8
1. Pilot Rest Requirements
Duty and rest requirements issued by the FAA currently pro-
hibit a pilot from flying in excess of "1,200 hours in any calendar
year," "120 hours in any calendar month," or "34 hours in any 7
consecutive days."99 These requirements also prohibit a one-pi-
lot flight crew from flying in excess of "8 hours during any 24
consecutive hours," and a two-pilot flight crew from flying in ex-
cess of "8 hours between required rest periods ... for the opera-
tion being conducted.""' With some exceptions, each
assignment must allow for a certain amount of rest "during the
24 consecutive hours preceding the scheduled completion of
any flight segment." '' These amounts are "9 consecutive hours
of rest for less than 8 hours of scheduled flight time"; "10 con-
secutive hours" for 8-9 "hours of scheduled flight time"; and "11
consecutive hours of rest for 9 or more hours of scheduled flight
time.' 0 2 Rest periods are "period [s] free of all responsibility for
work or duty should the occasion arise."'0 3
91 Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 308 (2006).
9' 49 U.S.C. § 1 0 6 (g); 49 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006).
93 49 U.S.C. § 106(g); 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006).
94 49 U.S.C. § 106(g); 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006).
95 49 U.S.C. § 106(g); 49 U.S.C. § 40109 (2006).
96 49 U.S.C. § 106(g); 49 U.S.C. § 40114 (2006).
97 49 U.S.C. § 106 (g); 49 U.S.C. § 40119 (2006).
98 See Airplanes of Boca, Inc. v. United States ex rel. FAA, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1304,
1312 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 680, 684 (4th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1960)) (noting
that air traffic "regulations have the force of law"); see also King v. NTSB, 362 F.3d
439, 441 (8th Cir. 2004); Cappello v. Duncan Aircraft Sales of Fla., Inc., 79 F.3d
1465, 1469 n.3 (6th Cir. 1996).
99 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(a)(1)-(3) (2011).
100 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(a)(4)-(5).
10, 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(b)-(c).
102 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(b)(1)-(3).
103 14 C.F.R. § 135.273(a) (2011).
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2. Pilot Training Requirements
A pilot must meet certain training requirements regulated by
the FAA.0'0 Under the current rules, a pilot must pass a written
or oral exam covering familiarity with "each type of aircraft to be
flown by the pilot"; navigation systems; "air traffic control proce-
dure"; meteorology, "including the principles of ... icing"; fa-
miliarity with "severe weather situations"; and familiarity with
"new equipment, procedures, or techniques, as appropriate.' 0 5
A pilot must also pass a "competency check," which "may in-
clude any of the maneuvers and procedures ... appropriate to
the category, class and type of aircraft involved."'1 6 These ma-
neuver and procedure checks must show "that the pilot [is] the
obvious master of the aircraft, with the successful outcome of
the maneuver never in doubt."'0 7 "Portions of [the] required
competency check may be given in an aircraft simulator or other
appropriate training device, if approved by the [FAA] Adminis-
trator. ''11 8 A pilot must also pass an "instrument proficiency
check," which "may be substituted for the competency check."'0 9
B. FEDERAL AvIATION REGULATIONS IN THE COURTS
Courts review interpretations of aviation regulations only if
they are final orders from the FAA. 1 0 The final order require-
ment is interpreted broadly, including even letters written by
FAA officials and orders issued "under the authority of the FAA
though not by the Administrator himself.""' It "permits any
104 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293 (2011).
105 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(a)(2)-(8).
106 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(b).
107 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(d).
108 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(0.
109 14 C.F.R. § 135.297(a) (2011); 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(c).
110 See, e.g., Zephyr Aviation, L.L.C. v. Dailey, 247 F.3d 565, 568, 571 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that a "suit should not have been dismissed because of a failure to
exhaust administrative remedies" where the plaintiff alleged "violations by indi-
vidual FAA inspectors" only because the FAA "appeal structure does not... pro-
vide a forum for redressing" such violations).
-ll S. Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n v. FAA, 881 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a "ban on fixed-wing aircraft travel" was not "outside the scope of'
the Federal Aviation Act when issued by "an FAA official" other than the Adminis-
trator, in this case the "Assistant Manager of the Air Traffic Division for the West-
ern-Pacific Region of the FAA"); New York v. FAA, 712 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding that "for purposes of review under [federal law], the term 'order'
should receive a liberal construction," extending the rule to an operating certifi-
cate where it "imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal
relationship").
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person 'disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by'
the FAA with respect to aviation safety matters to seek review in
an appropriate court of appeals." 1 2 The court of appeals re-
viewing the order may then "affirm, amend, modify, or set aside
any part of the order and may order the [Transportation] Secre-
tary, Under Secretary, or [FAA] Administrator to conduct fur-
ther proceedings.""11
In these cases, courts review the FAA's findings of fact as
set out in the Federal Aviation Act, applying a deferential stan-
dard of review. 114 The Federal Aviation Act establishes that
"[f] indings of fact by the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Admin-
istrator, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive."'' 15
Therefore, a court "gives the agency the benefit of the doubt,"
and sets those findings aside only if they are not supported by
substantial evidence. 116 "All other findings and conclusions are
reviewed to determine whether they are 'arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 117 Where a case concerns a violation of FAA regulations,
it is reviewed first by an administrative lawjudge." i After a hear-
ing before an administrative law judge, an appeal goes to the
NTSB, and an appeal from the NTSB goes to the federal courts
of appeals." 9 Federal courts of appeals "review an NTSB deci-
sion 'only to determine whether it is arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.' "120
112 Aviators for Safe & Fairer Regulation, Inc. v. FAA, 221 F.3d 222, 225-26 (1st
Cir. 2000) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (1994)) (holding that a "notice of enforce-
ment policy" is a final order "ripe for judicial review").
113 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c) (2006). This section of the Federal Aviation Act per-
mits judicial review by courts of appeals if the petitioner has properly filed his
objection and the clerk of the court has notified the Secretary of Transportation,
Deputy Secretary of Transportation, or Administrator of the FAA in compliance
with 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)-(b). 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c).
114 Id.; Flamingo Express, Inc. v. FAA, 536 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that the FAA did not err in determining that a liability insurance requirement
by a municipal owner was not unreasonable or discriminatory).
115 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c).
116 Flamingo, 536 F.3d at 567 (quoting Wilson Air Ctr., L.L.C. v. FAA, 372 F.3d
807, 813 (6th Cir. 2004)).
117 Id. (quoting the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2006)).
"s See Platt v. FAA, 45 F.3d 427, 427 (4th Cir. 1995).
119 See id.
120 Id. (quoting Hernandez v. NTSB, 15 F.3d 157, 158 (10th Cir. 1994); 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (A)).
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C. RULES IN TRANSITION
The FAA recently reported that "the fatality risk for commer-
cial aviation in the United States" dropped by 83% from 1998 to
2008.121 Unlike general aviation statistics, which report that
most accidents are caused by "loss of control in flight while ma-
neuvering,"122 these commercial aviation statistics do not reveal
a common cause. 123 "Since there are few commercial aviation
accidents and no common cause, more data points are
needed. '124 Yet, the FAA advisory committee study of 2011 and
the media response to it show that the cause of pilot error is of
particular concern to the media and the public.1 2
The DOT and the FAA responded to concerns about pilot
performance, announcing a "sweeping final rule" affecting pi-
lots and their capabilities in December 2011.126 But this sweep-
ing final rule had little to do with the subject of pilot error from
the earlier study. Instead, it changed rest requirements for pi-
lots. 1 27 Additionally, it proposed to spend $297 million on the
"aggressive effort," with the Secretary of Transportation calling
it "a major safety achievement." 128
1. Pilot Rest Requirements
Following the Colgan accident in 2009, congressional pres-
sure led to a promise to explore pilot fatigue and a proposed
new rule governing pilot rest requirements.1 29 By the end of
121 Press Release, FAA, Fact Sheet-Commercial Aviation Safety Team (Dec. 1,
2011) [hereinafter FAA Commercial Aviation Fact Sheet], available at www.faa.
gov/news/fact_sheets/newsstory.cfm?newslD=13257; see also Fact Sheet, FAA,
Gen. Aviation Safety (Sept. 21, 2011) [hereinafter FAA General Aviation Fact
Sheet], available at https://www.faa.gov/news/factsheets/news-story.cfm?news
Id=13103.
122 FAA General Aviation Fact Sheet, supra note 121.
123 FAA Commercial Aviation Fact Sheet, supra note 121.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., Lowy, supra note 3.
126 Press Release, FAA, FAA Issues Final Rule on Pilot Fatigue (Dec. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter FAA Press Release], available at https://www.faa.gov/news/press_re-
leases/news story.cfm?newsfd=13272.
127 Id.
128 Id. Cost estimates later increased to $2 billion. Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Auto-
mation or Fatigue?, supra note 7.
129 See Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 330-01
(codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 117, 119, 121); see also Flightcrew Member Duty and
Rest Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,852-01, 55,853 (proposed Sept. 14, 2010) (to
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 117, 121). The introductory paragraphs of the pro-
posed version of the rule include that in 2009 the FAA Administrator "testified
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2011, the FAA was rolling out new rest regulations that would
take effect two years later, citing the Colgan accident and the
2009 committee hearings as the driving forces behind the
change.130 The most significant change was the establishment
of "a [ten]-hour minimum rest period prior to the flight duty
period, a two-hour increase over the old rules.' 13 ' At the time of
the 2011 announcement, the cost of this and the other changes
imposed by the "rule to the aviation industry [was] $297 mil-
lion.'1 32 The FAA explained that the rule only applied to pas-
senger planes because extending its coverage to "cargo
operators.., would be too costly compared to the benefits gen-
erated in this portion of the industry.' '1 33
For this reason, the "long-awaited ... rule" came as a disap-
pointment to some. 34 Because the new duty and rest rule will
apply only to pilots of passenger aircraft, the rule "completely
ignores" pilots of cargo aircraft who experience the same fatigue
and require the same amount of rest. The FedEx Master Execu-
tive Council (MEC), the FedEx branch of the Air Line Pilots
Association, International (ALPA), expressed "outrage[ ]," call-
ing the new rule "a political failure.' ' 35 After all, cargo aircraft
travel in the same airspace as passenger aircraft, so fatigue of
cargo pilots is just as much a threat to air safety as fatigue of any
other pilot.136 In fact, as the MEC pointed out, "the back side of
the clock is exactly where the majority of cargo pilots find them-
selves operating aircraft," while the same cannot be said of pas-
senger pilots.1 37
before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Sub-
committee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety....
He ... committed to assess the safety of the air transportation system and to take
appropriate steps to improve it." 75 Fed. Reg. 55,852-01, 55,853.




134 See Press Release, FedEx Master Exec. Council, Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l,
FedEx Pilots Respond to Release of Pilot Fatigue Rule (Dec. 22, 2011) [hereinaf-




137 Id. "The back side of the clock" is a phrase that the press release attributed
to a NTSB spokesperson. Id.
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2. Pilot Training Requirements
Around the same time that pilot fatigue was in the spotlight,
the FAA was also reportedly looking into pilot error.' An FAA
official tasked with conducting an agency study on pilot training
was quoted as saying that pilots have an "automation addiction,"
and therefore need more mandatory manual flight training. 139
Captain Rory Kay, the co-chair of an FAA advisory committee on
pilot training, said, "We're seeing a new breed of accident with
these state-of-the-art planes .... We're forgetting how to fly. '' 4
But despite all the press attention this received, the study never
made it to the public and was soon forgotten.14' No one from
the FAA has commented on it, aside from Captain Kay, who has
been relatively quiet ever since, except to comment on airline
mergers in his capacity as a representative for the United Airline
Pilots Association in December 2011.142 Even more interest-
ingly, Captain Kay was quoted making the same comment years
earlier, before the study was ever mentioned to the press."'
The aviation industry pushed back on the negative attention
created by the study, calling out "some in the media" for dispro-
portionate concern over the alleged "automation addiction." '4 4
Dale Wright, Safety and Technology Director for the National
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), said that the adop-
tion of autopilot had created an "automation necessity" rather
138 See Editorial, Unintended Turbulence, AKRON BEACONJ., Sept. 5, 2011, http://
Avww.ohio.com/editorial/editorials/unintended-turbulence-1.233392; Sander-
son, supra note 1; Lowy, supra note 3.
139 Sanderson, supra note 1. Captain Kay first made this statement years
before, during remarks to the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 55th Air Safety
Awards banquet on August 6, 2009, in which he reportedly "urged the industry to
examine some [Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) ] data and find les-
sons.., about what he termed 'automation addiction."' Captain Kay is the Exec-
utive Air Safety Chairman of the ALPA. ALPA Pays Homage, AVIATION TODAY,
Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/ALPA-Pays-Homage-
34448.html.
140 Lowy, supra note 3.
141 See id.
142 Merged Airline's Pilots Pan New Safety Training, CBS NEWS (Dec. 30, 2011, 9:26
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500174_162-57350115/merged-airlines-pi-
lots-pan-new-safety-training/ (Captain Kay spoke to CBS about how possible air-
line mergers would impact pilot training and air safety, expressing concerns of
the pilots' association about "re-learn[ing] procedures").
143 See ALPA Pays Homage, supra note 139.
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than an "automation addiction." 145 The transition away from
maneuvering and toward automation has made the airline in-
dustry "more predictable and more stable," and has "taken many
variables out of flying, allowing more precision and accuracy. "146
More importantly, the trend is "inevitable."'47  Pilots also
"scoffied]" at Captain Kay's statement. 14 1 One Delta Air Lines
pilot clarified the role of autopilot: "Automation in cockpits is
there to assist pilots in maintaining the highest level of safety,
and that's why it's there. If the autopilot failed, it would be no
problem for the pilot.' 1 4
9
Six months earlier, the FAA had addressed this very issue, say-
ing that new rules on pilot training were also forthcoming. 150
Then-FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt indicated that new pro-
posed FAA rules would require pilots to use "advanced flight
simulators" in training and would focus on "recognizing, avoid-
ing and recovering from stalls and upsets.' 15' The impetus for
this change came from two sources, incorporating both the con-
gressional training mandates from the Airline Safety and Fed-
eral Administration Extension Act of 2010 as well as the '"3,000
pages of public comments" to the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing. 52 The new rule was to be one of "the most far-reaching
changes in training requirements in more than [twenty]
years.' 153  More than tweaking the current training require-
ments, it would "represent[ ] a shift in philosophy" in the
field. 154
Philosophical change is expensive and it takes time. 55 The
FAA first estimated that this one would cost airlines $230 million
over ten years.' 56 By May 2011, the estimated cost increased to
$391 million. 157 This is in addition to the $2 billion per year
that the airline industry says it will have to spend to comply with
145 Id.
146 Id. This quote is attributed to Aviation Today rather than to Mr. Wright. Id.
147 Id. This quote is also attributed to Aviation Today rather than to Mr. Wright.
Id.
148 Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, supra note 7.
149 See id.
150 See Kerry Lynch, FAA to Revamp Pilot Training Rules, AVIATION WK. & SPACE










the new duty and rest requirements that many believe will have
no impact. 158
The timing of implementation of these and other new re-
quirements was, and still is, uncertain. 159 FAA Associate Admin-
istrator for Aviation Safety Peggy Gilligan told Aviation Week in
May 2011, "There are six rules altogether and we are moving as
fast as we can."16
V. ANALYSIS
A. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PILOT FATIGUE
What is more troubling than the political failure of the new
duty and rest requirements is that, as a response to the Colgan
crash, they miss the mark.' 6 ' All accounts indicate that any lack
of rest on the part of the Colgan pilots had nothing to do with
the requirements; the pilots had, in fact, been given ample time
to rest.162 The new rest requirements were long-awaited, but
had little to do with the problem at hand. In fact, they were
more likely the result of "urging" by "safety advocates . . . for
more than two decades" than they were an appropriate response
to this accident.'63 The campaign against pilot error comes
closer to tackling the problems of the Colgan crash, though it
will ultimately miss the mark as well.
B. CONSIDERING PILOT ERROR: THE CAMPAIGNS COMPARED
Given the relative speed and success (at least with respect to
passenger pilots) with which the FAA tackled what it perceived
to be a problem with pilot fatigue, the campaign against pilot
error has been slow and misfocused on training requirements.
The Colgan crash brought a frenzy of attention to pilot fatigue
and pilot error, and from that point forward the response was
swift. But at some point the response to the Colgan accident
became focused on pilot fatigue and pilot training, rather than
158 Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, supra note 7.
159 See Lynch, supra note 150.
160 Id.
161 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2 (writing on the
NTSB hearings held after the accident, showing the prominent role of pilot error
in that crash, minimizing the role of pilot fatigue, and eliminating the possibility
that any fatigue would have been a result of either pilot's work schedule).
162 See id.
163 Tired Airline Pilots to See More Rest Under New FAA Rules, POLIrico (Dec. 21,
2011, 11:03 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70751.html.
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on pilot fatigue and pilot error. Perhaps this is because pilot
training is easier to change than inevitable pilot error.
Take, for example, another 2009 crash, the crash of a Pilatus
PC-12/45, N128CM in Butte, Montana on March 22, 2009.164
The NTSB accident report covering the Pilatus crash suggested
three likely causes, all essentially related to pilot error: "the pi-
lot's failure to ensure that a fuel system icing inhibitor was ad-
ded to the fuel before the flights on the day of the accident"; the
pilot's "failure to take appropriate remedial actions after a low
fuel pressure state (resulting from icing within the fuel system)
and a lateral fuel imbalance developed"; and "a loss of control
while the pilot was maneuvering the left-wing-heavy airplane
near the approach end of the runway. "165
Despite these findings, the NTSB recommendations to the
FAA and the European Aviation Safety Agency addressing the
safety issues involved in the crash did not include anything to
address pilot error.'66 Instead, these recommendations ad-
dressed only aircraft certification and a point of clarification for
pilots to prevent future icing problems.1 67 The report also in-
cluded some previous "open" recommendations to the FAA rele-
vant to the crash.' 6 However, the report did not include any
recommendation addressing the actions the pilot failed to
take.169 Nor did it include any recommendation pertaining to
pilot maneuvering or pilot training.170
There are two possible explanations for the lack of focus on
pilot training in the Pilatus report. It could be that the report
mistakenly blames equipment certification rather than pilot cer-
tification and training. Or it could be an accurate reflection of
the fact that pilot training is not at issue wherever there is pilot
error because pilot error, and more specifically human error,
cannot be eliminated. The latter explanation for the Pilatus re-
port seems more likely because, just as a pilot can have three
days off and still suffer from fatigue, a pilot may have all the
164 NTSB, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: Loss OF CONTROL WHILE MANEUVERING
PILATUS PC-12/45, N128CM, BUTTE, MONTANA, MARCH 22, 2009 vi, 1 (2011),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/AAR1105.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PILATus AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT].
165 Id.
166 Id. at 78-79.
167 Id. at 78.
168 Id. at 79.




training available to him and still not maneuver a plane properly
during an accident.1 71
As the Colgan crash shows, a pilot can know what to do and
simply not do it.172 This is a problem not of pilot training defi-
ciencies but of pilot error and plain human error, one unlikely
to be solved by NTSB recommendations and new regulations. It
is slightly more likely to be solved by increased personal respon-
sibility on the part of pilots. But most likely this problem will
not be solved at all. Human error in the cockpit may be simply a
tragic inevitability that the airline industry, the government, and
the traveling public must accept.
C. THE REAL POLITICAL FAILURE: IGNORING THE HUMAN
ELEMENT OF PILOT ERROR
Ignoring the human element of pilot error was a greater "po-
litical failure" than any other in the new pilot rules.'73 Accord-
ing to Colgan's statement at the 2009 NTSB hearings, "Captain
Renslow and First Officer Shaw did know what to do, had re-
peatedly demonstrated they knew what to do, but did not do
it."' 7" Thus, even with a reaction to this accident more focused
on training, the element of personal responsibility remains
unaddressed, both by government and media reports following
the crash.
Colgan also stated: "We cannot speculate on why they did not
use their training in dealing with the situation they faced."'
175
Truthfully, neither can anyone else-not the media, not Con-
gress, and not the FAA. This is evident in the regulation that
followed the incident. Bulky, costly, and slow as it has been, it
will never address the real problem of that flight-human er-
ror. 76 Though the term "human error" is used interchangeably
with "pilot error" in the field of aviation, a distinction should be
171 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2.
172 See id.
173 See FedEx Pilots Press Release, supra note 134 (calling the new rest rule in
particular "a political failure").
174 Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2.
175 Id.
176 Lynch, supra note 150 . After working on the new training rule for almost
two years, the timing of its implementation is still uncertain, though FAA Associ-
ate Administrator for Aviation Safety Peggy Gilligan told Aviation Week, "There
are six rules altogether and we are moving as fast as we can." Pilot training
changes were estimated to cost the airlines $391 million as of May 2011. Id. Duty
and rest changes were estimated to cost the airline industry another $2 billion
each year. Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, supra note 7.
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made between the two. Generally, pilot error can involve defi-
ciencies in training and skills as well as human factors such as
the inadvertent failure to correctly apply training and skills. 177
However, for the purposes of this comment, human error de-
scribes only the latter, because "[e]rrors are not de facto evi-
dence of lack of skill or conscientiousness.' 1 78 "Skill, vigilance,
and conscientiousness are essential but not sufficient to prevent
error." 1
79
Thus, even with a complete "shift in philosophy" focused
more on pilot training,1 8 1 flight simulations would not have pre-
vented the Colgan crash. The pilots had no shortage of training
using flight simulators. 8 ' Indeed, "Renslow had failed several
flight simulator tests before and after he was hired by Colgan
Air."'182 But even despite Captain Renslow's failed tests, it seems
that he knew what to do in the situation he faced; he simply
incorrectly assessed the circumstances and performed the wrong
maneuver. 83 This human error was the real problem of the
Colgan crash, it is one that cannot be solved simply by changing
the training curriculum, and it is something every industry and
profession must deal with.
In other professions, the inevitability of human error is ac-
knowledged.8 4 The field of medicine is famous for its use of
checklists, and those in business and other fields strive to emu-
late them in order to be profitable and successful.8 5 Interest-
ingly, it is an idea "borrowed . . . from the aviation industry,"
with the pilot's checklist serving as the model and inspiration
for the surgeon's checklist. 186 The goal behind such checklists is
177 KEY DISMUKES ET AL., AMES RESEARCH CTR., NASA, THE LIMITS OF EXPERTISE:
RETHINKING PILOT ERROR AND THE CAUSES OF AIRLINE ACCIDENTS (2006), available
at http://128.102.119.100/flightcognition/Publications/KDCRMHFConfer-
ence.pdf.
178 See id. at 6.
179 Id. at 7.
180 Lynch, supra note 150.
181 Colgan Air Crash Raises Safety Issues, supra note 2.
182 Id.
183 See id.
184 ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: How TO GET THINGS RIGHT 13
(2010).
185 See generally id.; Robin Marantz Henig, A Hospital How-To Guide That Mother
Would Love, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at C12, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/24/books/24book.html?pagewanted=al (reviewing GAWANDE,
supra note 184).
186 Henig, supra note 185.
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simply to "get the stupid stuff right. '18 7 But the medical check-
list has not eliminated human error in medicine. 18 8 Doctors
sometimes fail to follow the checklists available to them.
1 89
Sometimes, they "get the stupid stuff right," but then fail to get
the more complicated stuff right.190 They make mistakes. They
are only human.
Patients are aware of this human element of medical care and
the inherent risk involved, and yet patients still seek out the care
of doctors. The small possibility that a doctor may unintention-
ally cause harm to a patient is far outweighed by the likelihood
that a doctor will make the patient better. And if a doctor does
cause harm, the patient has little recourse available except to
sue and attempt to recover in court. This same standard, com-
plete with public acceptance of risk, should be the one the trav-
eling public applies to pilots. But overregulation has stymied
the public acceptance of the inherent risks of air travel. With
every accident, the media plays to the public's fears and Con-
gress is pressed to respond with more regulation, however point-
less it may be in relation to the subject of the media attention.
D. LEARNING FROM HISTORY: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
AND OTHER LESSONS
In the days of the Air Commerce Act, the purpose of federal
regulation was practical. With aircraft traveling from state to
state, it would have been impractical to continue to regulate
them through state and local laws.' One federal body of law
was needed to govern licensing pilots, ensuring consistent
routes, and avoiding accidents. 92 Similarly, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act of 1938, the next monumental piece of air legislation,
was practical because it directed necessary government attention
toward accidents and sought to prevent them. 9 ' Later, the CAB
and Civil Aviation Authority, instead of simply controlling pilot





191 See Flores, supra note 13, at 15-16.
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examples of bureaucracy gone wrong-"spotty," "unfocused,"
and "flawed."'95
And then a terrible accident changed aviation regulation for-
ever. 96 The 1956 mid-air collision of the TWA and United
planes over the Grand Canyon put the already flawed bureau-
cracy under the microscope. 197 Ironically, the response was to
bulk up the regulation.19 Newspaper articles pointing to a "gov-
ernment . . . unequipped to handle the rapidly expanding air
traffic" created an angry and critical public. 199
Congress responded the only way that it could by passing the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958.200 With the new DOT and FAA in
charge of air traffic control, incidents like the one in 1956 surely
would be avoided, but new threats would constantly emerge over
the next thirty years.20 '
The FAA describes these constant new threats as "unexpected
challenges. ' 2°2 Yet it seems that focusing on the unexpected led
the government astray. In the twenty-first century, the subject of
media controversy and congressional grandstanding is not over
"unexpected challenges," such as airplane hijackings, but rather
the challenge of properly training pilots and making sure that
they are fit to fly-something the FAA and its predecessor agen-
cies have been tasked with for almost one hundred years. 203
The one constant in all the changes the FAA has experienced is
that it is responsible for air safety.2 4 At its most basic level, air
safety is about instilling confidence in travelers that when they
board a plane in the United States, the aircraft and the person
flying it are both fit to fly. But after the media attention given to
the Colgan accident, 2 5 a traveler might feel more assured walk-
ing into a hospital and submitting himself to the mercy of a
tired and busy doctor with a checklist.206
195 See Bubb, supra note 19, at 661 (quoting ROCHESTER, supra note 19, at 291).
196 See id. at 659.




201 See FAA History, supra note 12 (describing "unexpected challenges" the
agency faced in the second half of the twentieth century, chief among them air-
plane hijackings).
202 See id.
203 See id.; Sanderson, supra note 1; Lowy, supra note 3.
204 See FAA History, supra note 12.
205 See, e.g., Wald & Robbins, supra note 5.
206 See Henig, supra note 185.
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Deregulation cannot resolve the shortcomings of recent regu-
latory efforts. The narrow deregulation that the airline industry
experienced in the last century remains controversial."' Thus,
to mark the thirty-fifth anniversary of the hearings that led to
deregulation, Justice Breyer reminds us that we still might not
be sure, as he is still asking rhetorically, "Was this effort worth-
while?" 208 And even though Justice Breyer supported deregula-
tion, and still does today, some clearly disagree.
While deregulation is not the answer to the issues facing com-
mercial aviation today, two lessons of deregulation are valuable.
First, tough economic conditions and other frustrations can trig-
ger overwhelming support for legislative overhaul.20 9 But such
overwhelming support does not legitimize an overhaul. In the
197 0s, the frustrations with air travel were primarily economic,
as they are today.210 Another frustration was that the "govern-
ment consistently was slow to respond," which is a fair assess-
ment during any era.211 Certainly, any reform that offers to save
people money and speed government up is going to be popular.
The new FAA rules discussed here actually offer opposite re-
SUIts, 2
1 2 yet they are relatively uncontroversial at this time.2 1 3
This does not mean that thirty-five years down the road the ef-
fort will appear to be worthwhile, as it may have with respect to
deregulation. 4
In fact, this reform will not have been worthwhile-not only
because it does not address the real problems of the Colgan
crash-but also because some consequences of costing the air-
lines billions in the current economy are certain to have a nega-
tive impact. The economic status of the airlines is uncertain and
volatile. 5 American Airlines filed for bankruptcy in November
2011 and is in the process of restructuring,210 making pay and
207 See Breyer, supra note 32.
208 See id.
209 See Bubb, supra note 19, at 662-64; see also Breyer, supra note 32.
210 See Bubb, supra note 19, at 662-63; see also Breyer, supra note 32.
211 See Bubb, supra note 19, at 667.
212 Pilot training changes were estimated to cost the airlines $391 million as of
May 2011. Lynch, supra note 150. Duty and rest changes were estimated to cost
the airline industry another $2 billion each year. Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automa-
tion or Fatigue ?, supra note 7.
213 See Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, supra note 7.
214 Breyer, supra note 32.
215 See Jad Mouawad, Leaner Operations Give U.S. Airlines a Profitable Year, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at B4.
216 See id.
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benefit cuts to its employees almost certain. 217 Even the airlines
that are currently profitable are so because they have become
leaner, partially by opting for "higher ticket prices and more
fees."21 Thus, the extra costs imposed by new regulation have
the foreseeable consequence of making the uncertainty and vol-
atility of the airline industry worse.2"9 Unfortunately, the fore-
seeable negative consequences are not all the industry must
worry about.
The second and more important lesson of deregulation is that
any legislative change, particularly an overhaul, always has "un-
intended consequences. '22' The columnist Thomas Sowell has
written about the unintended consequences of regulation and
other types of government action, warning that "wonderful-
sounding ideas" sometimes have "disastrous results. 2 21 Others
less skeptical of regulation than Mr. Sowell also take note of
these unintended consequences.222 For example, Cass Sunstein
and Thomas Miles warn against considering only "ex ante conse-
quences" because "the ex post perspective matters as well. 223
AndJustice Breyer acknowledges the inevitability of unintended
consequences, calling them "new, sometimes unforeseen,
217 Susan Carey, Workers at AMR to Hear of Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702033635045771853521509567
44.html?mod=googlenews wsj.
218 Mouawad, supra note 215 (listing United Continental Holdings, Delta Air
Lines, US Airways, and Southwest Airlines as profitable airlines in 2011 because
they employed this "recipe for success," for which the primary ingredients are
"fewer airlines, fewer planes and fewer seats combined with higher ticket prices
and more fees").
21q Breyer, supra note 32 (discussing the "unforeseen" consequences of
deregulation).
220 See Thomas Sowell, Parade of Intended Consequences, WASH. TIMES, June 10,
2001, at Bi (observing that use of the term "'unintended consequences' has
come up with increasing frequency, as more and more wonderful-sounding ideas
have led to disastrous results").
221 Id. (discussing the unintended consequences of dichlorodiphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT)); see also Thomas Sowell, Testing, Testing, NAT'L REV. ON-
LINE (Nov. 14, 2007), http://vvw.nationalreview.com/articles/222821/testing-
testing/thomas-sowell (discussing the unintended consequences of the autism
spectrum).
222 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & ThomasJ. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law,
DuKE L.J. 2193, 2215 (2009) (discussing the unintended consequences of striking
down regulatory agency decisions); Breyer, supra note 32 (discussing the unin-
tended consequences of deregulation, including "the extent to which new bottle-
necks would develop: a flight-choked Northeast corridor, overcrowded airports,
delays, and terrorist risks consequently making air travel increasingly difficult").
223 See Sunstein & Miles, supra note 222.
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problems" characteristic of "every major reform. '224 In the case
of deregulation, the unintended consequences of over-saturat-
ing the market and driving airlines into bankruptcy were high
prices to pay, though the goal of deregulation was simply to
bring prices down and make air travel more widely used.225 Just
as Senator Kennedy and the other deregulation reformers had
the best of intentions, so too did the leaders of the most recent
reform in airline regulation.226
E. THE SOLUTION: LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINT
The answer then, is not to deregulate, but to pause before
regulating. The answer is to stop being so responsive to media
pressure and to begin considering unintended consequences.
Because the Colgan crash was a salacious media story-scary,
mysterious, and heartbreaking-it was only natural that con-
cerns about pilot fatigue and pilot training came to the fore-
front as details of the crash were revealed. 227
Though these concerns and the subsequent increased atten-
tion to them were fair, further examination shows they were not
reflective of what caused the crash. 228 The cause of the crash
was not pilot fatigue caused by the pilots' flight schedules. 2 9
NTSB testimony shows the pilots had each had a significant
amount of time off prior to the flight. 230 So either both pilots
were adequately rested or First Officer Shaw was fatigued due to
poor scheduling choices she made prior to flight.231 Also, the
violation of the sterile cockpit rule was most likely inconsequen-
tial.232 Pilot training was closer to the source of the problem as
shown by the revelation of Captain Renslow's training failures,
such as his failure of "several flight simulator tests before and
after he was hired by Colgan Air. '233 At worst, however, the real
culprit was his failure to meet training requirements rather than
224 See Breyer, supra note 32.
225 See id. (recalling the story of "an East Boston constituent ask[ing] Kennedy,
'Senator, why are you holding hearings about airlines? I've never been able to
fly,"' to which Senator Kennedy reportedly "replied: 'That's why I'm holding the
hearings."').
226 See Schumer Calls for Hearing into Colgan Tragedy, Emails Released, supra note 6.
227 See Wald & Robbins, supra note 5.
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the inadequacies of the requirements themselves. More likely, it
was simply a mistake-he "reacted the wrong way to a stall warn-
ing and crashed the plane. 2 4 Captain Renslow should have
pushed forward, but he pulled back.23 5
The current laws and regulations are adequate to address
what ultimately turned out to be the non-issues of pilot fatigue
and pilot training in the Colgan crash. Investigations revealed
that neither Captain Renslow nor First Officer Shaw flew in ex-
cess of "34 hours in any 7 consecutive days" or in excess of "8
hours between required rest periods" as the flight time limit for
a two-person crew prohibited. 236 Both of their assignments al-
lowed for a "period free of all responsibility for work" well in
excess of the FAA requirement during the twenty-four hours
before their flight.2 37 Surely, from an objective point of view,
twenty-two hours is a sufficient period for rest, and if it is, then
three days must be much more than sufficient. 28
No one questions that these two pilots both passed a written
exam covering familiarity with the aircraft and equipment they
were using.239 Since these are required to cover meteorology,
"including the principles of... icinj'240 and familiarity with "severe
weather situations, "241 Captain Renslow had been properly
trained with respect to the ice he mistakenly believed the plane
was encountering. 24 2
However, Captain Renslow's training related to competency
checks could have violated FAA requirements. 243 One of those
requirements provides that a pilot must pass a "competency
check," including maneuver and procedure checks showing
"that the pilot [is] the obvious master of the aircraft, with the
234 Jerry Zremski, Colgan Deception Issue Extends to 2009 Probe: No Doubts on Pilot,
Investigators Told, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 26, 2011, at B1.
235 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2.
236 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(a)(3) (2011); Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety
Issues, supra note 2.
237 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(b); 14 C.F.R. § 135.273(a) (2011); Colgan Air Crash
Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2.
238 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2.
239 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(a)(2)-(3) (2011).
240 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(a) (6) (emphasis added).
241 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(a) (7) (i).
242 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2 (discussing cockpit
transcripts revealing that Captain Renslow believed the plane was encountering
ice and therefore performed a maneuver appropriate for responding to ice when
systems failed).
243 See generally id.; 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(b)-(d).
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successful outcome of the maneuver never in doubt.' '2 4 4 Investiga-
tion of the Colgan crash revealed that the "successful outcome
of the maneuver[s]" he conducted were indeed "in doubt. 245
The NTSB investigation showed that Captain Renslow "had
flunked numerous flight tests during his career and was never
adequately taught how to respond to the emergency that led to
the airplane's fatal descent. '246 Particularly, he had failed the
required tests "given in an aircraft simulator. 247
Unfortunate as these facts may be, a change in training re-
quirements and training curriculum would not change them.
These facts could possibly prove to be useful to the families with
lawsuits pending against Colgan, 24" but they do not justify sweep-
ing regulatory change in the unrelated areas of pilot fatigue and
pilot training. There is no need for a "sweeping final rule" af-
fecting pilot fatigue such as the one announced in December
2011.249 There is no need to cost the airlines billions through
an unnecessary rule change, particularly when even the new
rule "completely ignores" the pilots who are the most fatigued-
the cargo pilots that fly "the back side of the clock." 250 Further,
there was nothing to indicate a verifiable "automation addic-
tion" that necessitated changing federal training regulations. 251
Captain Kay may have been correct in identifying "a new breed
of accident" associated with automation and noting that pilots
are "forgetting how to fly.",2 5 2 But as the pilots who "scoffied]"
244 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(b)-(d) (emphasis added).
245 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(d); Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra
note 2.
246 Andy Pasztor, Captain's Training Faulted in Air Crash that Killed 50, WALL ST.
J., May 11, 2009, at Al; see also Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note
2.
247 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.293(f); Pasztor, supra note 246.
248 See In reAir Crash Near Clarence Ctr., New York, on February 12, 2009, 798
F. Supp. 2d 481, 481-82 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding "that (1) Federal Aviation Act
(FAA) preempted all state law standards of care relating to air safety, and (2)
New York law applied to calculation of punitive damages"). The ultimate out-
come of this litigation is uncertain, particularly since Colgan Air's parent, Pinna-
cle Airlines Corp., filed for bankruptcy earlier this year. See Kyle Peterson &
Sakthi Prasad, Pinnacle Airlines Corp. Files for Bankruptcy in U.S., REUTERS (Apr. 2,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/02/uk-pinnacleairlines-idUS
LNE83102K20120402.
249 See FAA Press Release, supra note 126.
250 See FedEx Pilots Press Release, supra note 134 ("The back side of the clock"
is a phrase the press release attributed to a NTSB spokesperson).
251 See Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, supra note 7. Captain Kay
first made this statement in 2009. ALPA Pays Homage, supra note 139.
252 Lowy, supra note 3.
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at Captain Kay's statement pointed out, automation in flying is
also essential to safety at the same time that it could be margin-
ally harmful.253
Despite all this, concerns stemming from the Colgan accident
led to legislation and regulation. 251 There is one virtuous kernel
in the forthcoming new rules on pilot training mandated by the
Airline Safety and Federal Administration Extension Act of
2010: a new FAA rule requiring pilots to use "advanced flight
simulators" in training focused on "recognizing, avoiding[,] and
recovering from stalls and upsets" is likely to be helpful in avoid-
ing similar accidents. 255 However, because it does "represent[ ]
a shift in philosophy" in the field, it may be part of an overall
effort that goes too far. 256 Certainly, it goes too far in that it will
cost the already-suffering airlines $391 million to comply.257
V. CONCLUSION
Controversy surrounding supposed hidden dangers of
autopilot has been the subject of public focus for many years,
and likely will be for many years to come.258 Student comments
like this one from ten to fifteen years ago warned of the dangers
of pilot fatigue, a danger due in part to pilots' prolonged inac-
tivity on increasingly automated airplanes. 259 In the last two
years, interest in this topic has been reignited, as allegations
made by the media and by Congress led to an expensive over-
haul of aviation regulation seeking to tackle pilot fatigue and
pilot training requirements. 260 And the FAA was forced to em-
brace a "shift in philosophy. 261
Ironically, an airplane crash in which neither pilot fatigue nor
pilot training were real issues brought these two non-problems
associated with the autopilot controversy to the forefront.26 2
253 Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automation or Fatigue?, supra note 7.
254 See FAA Press Release, supra note 126.
255 See Lynch, supra note 150.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See generally Temesha Evans-Davis, Comment, Pilot Fatigue: Unresponsive Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations and Increasing Cockpit Technology Threaten to Rock the Na-
tion's Pilots to Sleep and Compromise Consumer Safety, 65 J. AIR L. & Com. 567,
575-83, 600-01 (2000).
259 See generally id. at 567-68.
2-0 See Lynch, supra note 147.
261 See id.
262 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2 (discussing (1) the
fact that Renslow's employer allowed him to fly even though he had routinely
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The campaign to change regulation in these areas was only
strengthened by the catchy statement by an FAA official publicly
announcing an "automation addiction. 263 Though the FAA has
yet to make the "automation addiction" study public, through its
advisory committee, it added fuel to a fire of controversy in two
areas already under the public eye: pilot fatigue and pilot
training.264
In response to the media coverage, Congress held hearings
and was left with seemingly no choice but to direct the FAA to
implement new regulations to take the place of the old ones,
even though change was not necessary and would not have pre-
vented the crash that triggered their promulgation.265 The in-
tended impact was safer flight.266 But the unintended impacts
will be a cost to the airlines in billions of dollars267 and the alien-
ation of non-passenger pilots, who feel ignored and unap-
preciated by the new regulations. 26 As with the era of aviation
deregulation that began in the 1970s, other unintended conse-
quences are certain to follow. 26 9 In the meantime, the problems
that led to the Colgan crash remain.
Even with rules in place-old or new-pilots will make mis-
takes, just as everyone else does, sometimes unintentionally en-
dangering lives. This inevitable problem can only be resolved in
two ways. First, it may be resolved through increased personal
responsibility, something that cannot be legislated or regulated.
It can, however, be litigated; thus, recourse in the courts is the
second way to address mistakes and rule-breaking. Here,
neither solution seems to be a perfect fit, but both are prefera-
ble to a regulatory overhaul mandating that airlines throw
money at other problems entirely. If we are going to embrace a
failed flight simulation tests and (2) cockpit transcripts revealing that Captain
Renslow believed they were encountering ice and therefore performed a maneu-
ver appropriate for responding to ice when systems failed).
263 Lowy, supra note 3.
264 See id.
265 See Colgan Air Crash Raises Many Safety Issues, supra note 2; FAA Press Re-
lease, supra note 126.
266 FAA Press Release, supra note 126.
267 Pilot training changes were estimated to cost the airlines $391 million as of
May, 2011. Lynch, supra note 150. Duty and rest changes were estimated to cost
the airline industry another $2 billion each year. Bigger Pilot Safety Issue: Automa-
tion or Fatigue, supra note 7.
268 See FedEx Pilots Press Release, supra note 134.
269 Breyer, supra note 32.
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"shift in philosophy," we should be willing to pause and deter-
mine first whether it will solve the problems we face and
whether it is worth the unintended consequences that follow.
